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The topic of industrial restructuring and incorpora-
tion of technological progress is one with which both 
industrialized and developing countries are preoccu-
pied, whether their economies are of the market or 
of the planned type. 
The approach of the industrialized nations to 
this process is radically different from the one pre-
vailing in Latin America. In the industrialized coun-
tries, industrial restructuring is intended to secure 
improved competitiveness, understood as a country's 
capacity to expose itself to the external market and to 
maintain or raise its people's living standards. In 
Latin America, in contrast, the basic aim, with a few 
recent exceptions, is to generate a sufficient trade 
surplus to service the enormous foreign debt; this 
does not necessarily lead to improved competitive-
ness and it often lowers the precarious standard of 
living of large sections of the population. This is the 
difference between competitiveness based on tech-
nological progress, which is what the industrialized 
nations seek, and competitiveness based on reduc-
tion of incomes. 
There is a broad range of theories about the 
factors which initiated this process in the industrial-
ized countries and about its consequences in the 
economic, social, political and cultural fields. Asso-
ciated with this broad range of theories there is a 
similar variety of policy recommendations. 
In this article the author seeks to outline the 
main features of the siruation in rhe advanced coun-
tries. He examines the various factors which explain 
the process, with emphasis on the topic of interna-
tional competitiveness. He also draws attention to 
the experience of some of these countries which may 
be useful in the regional debate. 
•Officer in charge, Joint ECLAC/UNIDO Industry and 
Technology Division, Santiago, Chile. 
I 
Underlying reasons for 
industrial restructuring 
The various explanations of this process offered 
in the past decade differ in their identification of 
its main determinants, the links between them, 
and the way in which they affect the situation. 
The following are some of the factors which 
are hard to ignore in a theory which seeks to 
embrace the topic of industrial restructuring in 
all its complexity: i) the dizzying rise in the price 
of oil in the past decade and its erratic subse-
quent movements; ii) the financial disorder and 
explosive increase in liquidity; iii) the saturation 
of the consumption pattern prevailing since 
mid-century; iv) the shift towards a new techno-
logical model based on "information technol-
ogy" (IT); v) the dramatic improvement in the 
trade competitiveness of Japan and the new 
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia in rela-
tion to the rest of the world; and vi) the exacer-
bation of the fiscal and external imbalances of 
the United States, the pivot and basic point of 
reference of the world's economic expansion in 
the post-war period. 
Although of different kinds, these factors are 
interrelated and they have been subject to chang-
ing priorities in recent years. From 1973 atten-
tion was focused on the oil price hike and the 
uncontrolled expansion of liquidity, factors 
linked to each other through the recycling of the 
revenues of the oil-producing countries. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, when people 
became aware of the structural origins of the 
world economy's loss of vigour, the other factors 
were given greater attention. These factors were 
interrelated because the protagonists —Japan 
and the Asian NICs— had succeeded in the task 
of incorporating new internationally tradeable 
consumer goods and the plants and processes 
required for their production —the IT devised 
and developed by engineers in activities asso-
ciated mainly with the United States space and 
military programme. 
By the middle of the current decade the 
imbalances in the United States economy had 
reached unprecedented proportions. This under-
lined the precariousness of that country's growth 
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since 1983 which had served as the locomotive of 
the world economy. 
There are several hypotheses on offer with 
respect to the causal relations between the fac-
tors described above. It cannot be denied that all 
of them must be taken into account in the formu-
lation of policies for industrial restructuring. It 
must be recognized, however, that in the indus-
trialized countries the question of competitive-
ness dominates the academic and political debate 
and the rest of the topic is organized around it. 
Industrial restructuring is understood in these 
countries basically as the need to adapt to the 
challenge of competition. 
The school of thinking which focuses its 
analysis on technological change1 maintains that 
the world will not emerge from the present 
cycle, characterized by an overall loss of vigour, 
without the introduction in the economic, social 
and political spheres of innovations which will 
incorporate and make full use of the new "tech-
nical economic paradigm". Some of its main 
consequences will be: i) reduced importance of 
economies of scale based on mass production 
using capital-intensive techniques; ii) greater 
integration within a company of the functions of 
design, production, purchasing, and research and 
development; iii) the capacity rapidly to change 
products and processes; iv) co-ordination of 
integrated networks of suppliers of parts and 
components, assembly plants, distributors and 
research and development laboratories, with 
major saving of capital; and v) emergence of 
new service activities associated with production 
(software, design, technical information) which 
can be carried out by small companies. 
This line of argument calls for comment. Of 
course, the debate about the validity of the "wel-
fare State" in the industrialized countries —and 
to some extent in the planned-economy 
countries— is a response to the "threat" of the 
increased international competitiveness of 
Japan and its Asian disciples. IT requires institu-
tional changes and makes them viable, but there 
is clear awareness of the danger of increasing 
inability to compete in international markets. 
'SeeSchumpeter (1950), Mensch (1979), Freeman andSoete 
(1982,1985), and Freeman (1987). A fundamental questioning of 
the validity of "long waves" will be found in Rosenberg and 
Frischtak (1984), pp. 7-24. 
Japan's astonishing assault on the world 
economy —specifically on the United States 
market— is due both to external and to internal 
factors. The most decisive external factor is the 
scale, vigour and openness of the United States 
economy in spite of the various protectionist 
pressures brought to bear at the sectoral level. 
The internal factors which explain the excep-
tional efficiency and speed with which Japan has 
incorporated IT in products and processes 
include: i) the capacity, at the national and com-
pany level, to identify areas of technology of 
strategic importance in the medium and long 
term; ii) the existence of institutional machinery 
capable of channeling to these areas enormous 
resources for investment and technological 
development; iii) the flexibility of the industrial 
structure, based in particular on the links 
between leading conglomerates and small and 
medium-sized industries; and iv) the systematic 
approach to the design of products and processes 
and the co-ordination of planning and manufac-
turing activities. 
It is also true that the peculiar international 
financial system has a great impact on institu-
tions —in addition to its direct influence on the 
real economy— for it even casts doubt on the 
independence of national States in determining 
their economic policies. 
It could be argued that IT plays a cardinal 
role both in Japan and in the functioning of the 
international system, but this should not prevent 
recognition of the importance and specific 
nature of each of these phenomena. In turn, the 
subsequent development of the United States 
economy and its competitiveness in relation to 
Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany will 
have a great influence on the other factors. The 
"institutional" solutions adopted by the United 
States will determine to some extent the perfor-
mance of the financial system, the nature of the 
restructuring which Japan and the Federal 
Republic have to undertake, the intensity and 
modalities of the mass extension of the use of IT, 
the management of a whole new consumption 
pattern, and, to a lesser extent, the movement of 
the oil market. 
There now follows a brief comparison of the 
international engagement of these three coun-
tries, designed to establish a frame of reference 
for the subsequent discussion. 
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II 
The international engagement 
of the leading industrial countries 
The population of the three countries in ques-
tion —the United States, Japan and the Federal 
Republic of Germany— accounts for about 9% 
of the world's population and is similar in size to 
Latin America's. However, their economic 
weight is very impressive, for they generate 
40% of the world product, and their productivity 
is four times the world average. Furthermore, 
they account for one-half and about 75 % respec-
tively of the resources which the international 
community and OECD spend on research and 
development; their per capita expenditure under 
these headings is five times the world average. 
For these reasons, the performance of these 
countries shapes the profile of the world indus-
trial system and is representative of its main 
features. Leaving aside the current trade ten-
sions, there is no doubt that the type of product 
and the manufacturing processes and methods 
prevailing in the world economy are the fruit of 
the interaction between these three countries, as 
are the institutional agreements and the access 
which other countries can have to the future 
evolution of knowledge in the various industrial 
sectors. 
There are important differences between 
the United States on the one hand andjapan and 
the Federal Republic on the other (table 1). The 
United States possesses a much broader scien-
tific production base. The ratio of its scientific 
writers to the population at large is seven times 
the world average, while in the Federal Republic 
it is four times and in Japan only twice that 
average. In clear contrast, the manufacturing 
output of these latter two countries, taken 
together, is already nearly 20% higher than the 
United States output, although their population 
is one-fifth smaller. The imbalance in the United 
States seems to be attributable to some degree to 
the volume of resources which it spends for 
military purposes, purposes for which Japan and 
the Federal Republic spend insignificant 
amounts, in compliance with the obligations 
imposed on them at the end of the Second World 
War. 
Table 1 
ECONOMIC A N D T E C H N O L O G I C A L W E I G H T O F 
THE UNITED STATES, J A P A N A N D 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY I N ABOUT 1980 
(Percentages of world total) 
1. Population 
2. Gross domestic product 
3. Manufacturing product 
4. Capital goods 
5. Engineers and scientists 
6. Resources spent on 
research and technological 
development 



























Source: UCI.AC/UN IDO Joint Division, on the basis of data of the 
United Nations, UNIDO and UNESCO, international 
Science and Technology Data. Updated ¡986, National 
Science Foundation and Current Bibliographical Directory. 
It is worth noting that the ratio of engineers 
and scientists in Japan is five times the world 
average, while in the United States and the Fed-
eral Republic it is only three times that average, 
in very approximate terms. When it comes to 
numbers of lawyers, in contrast, first place 
belongs to the United States (279 per 100 000 
inhabitants, as against 77 in the Federal Repub-
lic and 11 in Japan).2 
Lack of natural resources is a structural 
datum in the cases of Japan and the Federal 
Republic, but the United States is generously 
endowed and has a territory of continental 
dimensions (table 2). Accordingly, the first two 
countries are obliged to secure a solid share of 
international trade in manufactures, which the 
United States views, in contrast, as a strictly 
supplementary and marginal factor, and it does 
not take very much interest in the allocation of 
sectoral priorities either. The people of the Uni-
2See The Economist, 22 August 1987. 
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ted States still hold the view, bolstered by the 
economic hegemony which their country exer-
cised for 40 years, that their main market is the 
domestic one and that,-although the relative 
importance of the various sectors may change 
over time, the system as a whole appeared, at 
least up to the end of the 1970s, little short of 
invulnerable. Several analysts confirm the domi-
nance in economic, political and academic circles 
of an outlook focused on domestic problems 
(Branson and others, 1980; Lodge, 1986; Zys-
man and Tyson, 1983; Oxford Analytica, 1986; 
Lodge and Vogel, 1987). 
The 1973 oil price hike placed an additional 
heavy burden on the three countries. However, 
in the cases of Japan and the Federal Republic, 
the higher energy bill was offset by growth in the 
manufacturing sector's surplus. On the other 
hand, the United States energy deficit was aggra-
vated by a considerable erosion —about 
US$8 000 million between 1975 and 1981— of 
its manufacturing surplus. Industrial perfor-
mance was markedly better in Japan and the 
Federal Republic because these two countries 
had created a support base which enabled them 
to react flexibly and promptly to the signals of 
the forthcoming demise of the era of cheap 
energy. 
The differences in the performance of the 
manufacturing sector were accentuated from the 
mid-1970s. Accordingly, by the middle of the 
current decade Japan and the Federal Republic 
had a joint trade surplus already close to 
US$200 000 million in the manufacturing sec-
Table 2 
U N I T E D STATES, J A P A N A N D THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: TRADE 




















































































































































Source: ECLAC/UNIDO Joint Division, on the basis of United Nations figures. International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1970-1971, 
¡977, 1983 and 1984, and Commodity Trade Statistics, 1985. 
"Manufactures includes SITC sections 5 to 8, except for division 68. 
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tor, while the United States had a deficit of over 
US$80 000 million. The first two countries were 
the most important source of the world manu-
facturing surplus; but the United States was the 
country with the clearest manufacturing deficit. 
In the early 1970s, the three countries had 
fairly modest surpluses of comparable orders of 
magnitude, although they were bigger in Japan 
and the Federal Republic. In barely 15 years, 
then, the relative position has been turned 
around. The United States, which at the end of 
the Second World War generated 60% of the 
world's industrial output, now finds itself in the 
mid-1980s in a subordinate position to the very 
two countries which stood in ruins at the end of 
that conflict. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the interna-
tional engagement of the United States was very 
similar to that of most of the Latin American 
countries. It was based on the farming sector, in 
which there was a considerable surplus. Under 
all the other headings the United States econ-
omy was in deficit, especially in the manufactur-
ing sector, so that changes in the terms of trade 
became a matter of vital importance for the 
United States. 
There are no reasons to suppose that the 
historical trend of the erosion of the terms of 
trade of the farm sector in relation to the indus-
trial sector will come to an end. If the export and 
import volumes of agricultural and industrial 
goods remain constant, the United States will 
experience a growing deterioration associated 
with the evolution of the terms of trade at the 
world level. Thus, the preoccupation with this 
variable —until a few years ago considered part 
of Latin American folklore— is now affecting 
the country which leads the world economy. 
There is broad agreement on the existence of 
a strong link between competitiveness, incorpo-
ration of technological advances, industrial 
vigour and increased productivity. Increased 
competitiveness is an inescapable necessity in a 
period of transition between two technological 
models and it is a decisive factor in the medium-
and long-term changes in the relative position of 
countries in the international economy. This is 
why the efforts being made by the developed 
countries to improve their competitiveness in 
the industrial sector warrant from their respec-
tive governments a degree of priority similar to 
that assigned to the most crucial political prob-
lems, a situation found in the past only in time of 
war. This is borne out by the importance which 
Europe attaches to its various regional pro-
grammes of scientific or technical co-operation. 
There is less agreement about how to mea-
sure competitiveness and still less about how to 
increase it. There is agreement that the erosion 
of productivity which began two decades ago and 
which has been accelerating since the second half 
of the 1970s, especially in the United States, is 
fraught with serious potential consequences. 
However, there is wide desagreement about the 
reason for this decline and therefore about the 
most efficient means of reversing it. 
The relative position of the three countries 
is the same in all seven of the alternative indica-
tors of competitiveness considered in this arti-
cle: Japan first, the Federal Republic second, and 
the United States last (table 3). 
The research and development effort for 
civilian purposes is significantly greater injapan 
and the Federal Republic, and several studies 
mention this fact as a possible reason for the 
different growth rates of competitiveness in the 
three countries. On the other hand, the dyna-
mism of Japan's industrial exports has been 
overwhelming in the last few decades; their 
growth rate is double that of the overseas sales of 
the other two countries. Japan also leads the way 
in the share of products with the largest techno-
logical content in total exports of manufactures. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that in 1983 the 
Federal Republic's share in world sales of these 
products was the same as 20 years earlier, the 
United States share was equivalent to only 74%, 
and Japan's share had increased almost fivefold. 
The next indicator used in this exercise 
relates more specifically to the competitiveness 
of the goods called engineering products, which 
are those with a high content of modern technol-
ogy, as pointed out earlier. The exports/imports 
ratio for this kind of goods was nearly 4:1 in 1963 
in the United States and West German econo-
mies but it was much lower in both countries in 
1983, although more so in the United States. In 
Japan, in contrast, the ratio increased almost 
fivefold in the period. 
The rate of increase of productivity, a deci-
sive factor in the long-term evolution of compe-
titiveness has weakened from the mid-1970s. 
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This phenomenon has been more intense in the 
United States, where the improvement had been 
slower in the previous period. The productivity 
growth rate in the two subperiods considered 
here is higher in Japan, followed by the Federal 
Republic, maintaining the constant situation 
observed in all the indicators (table 3). 
This order applies not only to the level but 
also to the path of competitiveness, as can be 
seen from a comparison of the exports/imports 
ratio of manufactures in the three-year period 
1979-1981. It is five for Japan, less than two for 
the Federal Republic, and barely one for the 
United States. 
I l l 
Determinants of international competitiveness 
In the medium and long term, competitiveness is 
a country's capacity to sustain and expand its 
share of international markets and at the same 
time to improve its people's standard of living. 
This requires increased productivity and there-
fore the incorporation of technological advances. 
International experience teaches that there 
is no "other way" to secure a solid improvement 
in a country's competitiveness. It is true that in 
the short term devaluation of a country's cur-
rency improves the relative position of its busi-
ness sector. However, this resort is of limited 
effectiveness because it does not in itself increase 
productivity or encourage the incorporation of 
technological advances. On the other hand, it 
tends to erode social cohesion, and this subse-
Table 3 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L COMPETITIVENESS: VARIOUS INDICATORS 
R & D expenditure/GDP (1983-1984) 
Percentage increase export manufactures 
(1983-1963) 
Exports capital goods/total exports manufactures 
(1983) (percentage) 
Exports capital goods/world exports capital goods 
(1983-1963) (percentage) 




Growth manufacturing productivity (percentage) 
1975-1981 
1965-1973 
























































Source: ECLAC/UNIDO Joint Division, Global Competition, p. 100; United Nations, Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in 
Engineering Products, 1983; World Bank Report, Productivity in industry, OECD, 1986. 
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quently works against the viability of more effec-
tive international engagement. It is natural that 
countries should endeavour to increase their 
international competitiveness by making use of 
the available cheap manpower and of subsidized 
lines of credit and to offset the small or even 
negative margins in the external market with 
high profits obtained in the protected domestic 
market, or to use specific tax exemptions, etc. 
They may achieve satisfactory profits in this 
way, but these profits will have little to do with 
an increase in the country's competitiveness, 
taken in the broad sense, even though the trade 
balance and the exports coefficient may also 
show improvements. 
From a narrow perspective, it can be argued 
that Latin America has made great progress in 
its international competitiveness during the 
1980s. But this progress appears spurious when 
a more integrated approach is taken, for there 
has been a decline in per capita income, a fall in 
investment coefficients, smaller expenditure on 
technological research and development and 
education, and erosion of real wages. 
This is not to neglect the fact that in recent 
years some countries or sectors have achieved 
"genuine" increases in competitiveness —in 
contrast to what would be a "false" increase— 
based on improved productivity resulting from 
the incorporation of technological advances. 
Such a development is an important prelude to 
the accomplishment of effective modernization 
of the production apparatus. 
The considerable increase in the trade sur-
pluses of many of the region's countries has been 
achieved for the sole purpose of sustaining the 
large transfer of financial resources required by 
service of the external debt, and it has thus not 
satisfied any of the essential requirements of 
genuine modernization. It should not be con-
fused therefore with the auspicious beginning of 
a process of sustained and solid improvement of 
the competitiveness of the Latin American pro-
duction apparatus. 
It has already been pointed out that in the 
short term the only policy tool which can affect a 
country's competitiveness quickly and substan-
tially is the exchange rate. However, an analysis 
of the medium term will reveal divergent trends 
in the relative positions of the industrialized 
nations in international trade in manufactured 
goods. 
What happened in the 1980s, with the 
erratic fluctuations in the dollar —sharp rise to 
1985 and subsequent fall— demonstrates that, 
despite the marked variations in trade flows, the 
long-term trends persist, i.e., erosion of the 
industrial competitiveness of the United States, 
steady rise of Japan, and slight improvement of 
the Federal Republic. It must be concluded there-
fore that the differences in international engage-
ment are due to a large extent to structural 
factors which also affect the modalities and 
results of the national strategies and the use 
which each country makes of specific tools of 
economic and industrial policy. 
There now follows an attempt to identify 
some of the factors which explain the countries' 
different competitiveness in the industrial 
sector. 
1. The rate of investment 
The investment coefficient goes far to explain 
increased productivity (Denison, 1980). Coun-
tries with sluggish investment rates experience a 
decline in their productivity growth rate and 
therefore in their competitiveness, as demon-
strated by the experience of Japan, the United 
States and the United Kingdom in the past three 
decades. Japan and the nine industrialized coun-
tries of Asia demonstrate that increases in the 
investment rate translate into considerable 
improvements in competitiveness. 
2. Allocation of investment resources 
Industrial restructuring implies the movement 
between sectors of large volumes of investment 
resources, a process involving companies, the 
financial system and the public sector, and one 
which has different characteristics in each coun-
try, depending on the relative importance of the 
various actors and their mutual relationships 
(Zysman, 1984). 
In the United States and the United King-
dom the level of corporate debt to the financial 
system is substantially lower than in Japan, the 
Federal Republic and France (table 4). In the 
first two countries, the capital market deter-
mines the destination of savings, including those 
generated in the companies themselves, which 
may be used for investment, financial specula-
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Table 4 
DEBT COEFFICIENT/COMMERCIAL VALUE OF THE ASSETS OF THE 

























































Source: ECLAC/UNIDOJoint Division, on the basis of Bank fur International Settlements, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report, April ¡98iMarch 
1986. 
"Estimates. 
All businesses, except for housing sector. 
'1970-1973. 
tion or personal consumer loans. In the other 
countries, in contrast, a specific percentage of 
investment resources (large projects) is allo-
cated in accordance with sectoral priorities 
determined institutionally by the banking sys-
tem or the public sector, i.e., regardless of who 
has generated the savings (table 5). 
3. The labour market 
and the "welfare State" 
Industrial restructuring implies relocations 
which inevitably involve high human and eco-
nomic costs. This invests with great importance 
the question of the "rigidities in the labour 
market", which has led to the questioning of the 
"welfare State" (Pfaller, 1987; Daudestadt, 
1987). 
The decades of growth and prosperity 
created an institutional system which comple-
mented and reduced the effects of the free play of 
market forces. Through the establishment of 
minimum wages, the introduction of wage 
indexing, the payment of unemployment and 
other social-security benefits, the implementa-
tion of training programmes, and the granting 
of regional subsidies, this institutional system 
provided protection and support for the rela-
tively disadvantaged social groups, production 
sectors and geographical areas. The constant 
expansion of this system, which was funded 
partly by business, has seriously undermined 
microeconomic-social efficiency, rendering it 
incompatible with the demands of international 
competitiveness. 
The problem is that this "welfare State" also 
provided benefits of the macroeconomic-social 
kind, which acquire special importance in the 
times of structural change. They include the 
social legitimacy of the institutions, which pro-
motes social cohesion, and the existence of an 
advanced education system and therefore of a 
highly qualified labour force. It may be added 
that it is difficult to perceive through aggregate 
indicators the true nature and dimensions of the 
"welfare State". More important than the quan-
titative weight of the public institutions is the 
Table 5 
TYPOLOGY OF FINANCIAL-INDUSTRIAL 
SYSTEMS 






Regulated lending with controlled 
prices 
Regulated lending by the banking 
system 
Capital market 
Source: J. Zysnian, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial 
Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change, Cornell 
University Press, 1983. 
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kind of relationship established between them 
and the business and labour sectors. Further-
more, despite the revival of "pre-Keynesian" 
rhetoric the quantitative weight of the public 
sector and of social security in industrialized 
countries has not declined (tables 6, 7 and 8). 
The most substantial differences are 
between Japan and the United States, even 
though in both these countries the economic 
weight of the public sector is relatively small in 
comparison with the situation in European 
countries. These differences are due to the oppo-
site methods of integration between the public 
and private sectors, which manifest themselves 
in sharp differences in the use of policy tools by 
the Japanese and United States authorities. 
The European labour market has acquired 
considerable flexibility during the 1980s. Wage 
indexing has been adjusted (Italy, Belgium and 
France) or abolished (Denmark); part-time 
work has been encouraged (France and Federal 
Republic) ; unemployment benefits have 
declined in relation to average wages (Denmark 
and United Kingdom), as have social-security 
contributions (France, Denmark, Belgium and 
United Kingdom). Furthermore, part-day work-
ing and early retirement are encouraged 
(Netherlands, Belgium and Federal Republic) 
and attempts are made to erode administratively 
(United Kingdom) the role of trade unions in 
wage negotiations (BIS, 1986). However, the 
aggregate effect of this process of gradual "flexi-
bilization" has not been, contrary to expecta-
tions, to reduce the importance of the public 
sector in the economy. 
4. Industrial relations 
There is increasing agreement concerning the 
effect on productivity of management-labour 
industrial relations at the level of the plant and 
the industrial sector, as well as at the national 
level. Despite the differences in institutional 
modalities, it can be systematically demonstrated 
that a lower level of conflict in these relations 
promotes increased productivity. This is demon-
strated by the experience of Japan and of the 
Western European countries in general, in con-
trast to the experience of the United States and 
the United Kingdom, where industrial relations 
are more contentious. 
This question acquires greater importance in 
a period of industrial restructuring when a new 
technological model is coming into being which 
requires the constructive co-operation of the 
various economic, social and political actors in 
order to "absorb" and distribute the cost of the 
structural adjustment (Piore, 1986; Brown and 
Bennett, 1986). 
5. Business organization 
The intensification of international competi-
tion, the emergence of a new technological 
model, and the rapid changes in market prefer-
ences are the reasons for the clear trend towards 
innovation both within the organizational struc-
ture of business and in relations between com-
panies. In both cases, vertical hierarchical 
relations are being replaced by relations of hori-
zontal co-operation. The basic criterion is the 
achievement of the flexibility which makes it 
possible to incorporate technological innova-
tions at the right time and to adapt to the chang-
ing conditions of demand, in a context of 
increasing international competition. 
The initial premise is that co-operation and 
compromise amongst people working at the var-
ious levels of a company are a decisive factor in 
securing productivity increases. This applies 
from the design to the quality-control phase 
(Arnold and Ken, 1987; Drucker, 1987a and 
1987b). From the standpoint of the organiza-
tional plan, it means reducing the number of 
vertical levels and strengthening the horizontal 
integration at every level. 
Co-operation between companies, which 
takes very diverse forms, has tended to intensify 
in a context of increasing unification of the inter-
national market with respect to supply, demand 
and technological assets. Some of the more inter-
esting manifestations of this phenomenon are 
described below. 
Í) Networks of companies. Assemblers, 
suppliers, marketers and technological research 
centres are linked, under flexible agreements, 
with central co-ordinating offices dealing with 
finance, advertising and corporate strategy. 
ii) Research and development co-operation 
arrangements between European companies 
and governments (EUREKA programme). 
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iii) Co-operative efforts in research and 
development and co-production between com-
panies in the automotive sector of the United 
States, Japan and Europe. 
iv) Co-operative research and development 
arrangements between semiconductor manufac-
turers in the United States, with emphasis on 
production engineering. Agreements of this 
kind have long been common in Japan, led by 
MITI; perhaps the most significant development 
has been the 20-year programme to tackle the 
"IBM challenge". 
v) In the sectors most vulnerable to 
"fashion", there are arrangements under which 
competition at the model-exhibition stage coex-
ists with co-operation at the production stage, 
once the market has determined the "winners". 
In turn, the proliferation of co-operation 
arrangements among multinational corpora-
tions is due in part to the increasing cost of 
product and process development, and to the 
need to adapt to sudden shifts in exchange-rate 
parities. The multinationals seem to have real-
ized that at the present time technological know-
how and occupational skills are distributed fairly 
evenly among the industrialized countries; 
accordingly, any stage of the production process 
can be carried out in any place. They therefore 
find it convenient to build plants or sign agree-
ments with companies in other countries of the 
various regions, a procedure which also helps to 
overcome any protectionist barriers. 
6. The infrastructure of 
education, research and 
development 
There is unanimous agreement that this aspect 
is a vital requirment and component of any 
industrial restructuring which incorporates suit-
able technological advances. This is the reason 
for the increase since the end of the 1970s in the 
volume of resources allocated to research and 
development in the industrialized countries, and 
for the awareness that it is essential to adapt the 
education system to the new requirements. 
One interesting difference between the 
countries is the volume of research and develop-
ment resources allocated to the military industry 
and the evaluation of its impact on competitive-
ness. The debate about the collateral effect of 
these investments on the whole of the industrial 
sector is far from exhausted. Coexistence would 
seem possible, at least for specific periods, 
between low levels of activities having radically 
different challenges, processes, time-frames and 
organizational forms. In military matters prior-
ity is given to the determination of objectives 
and targets rather than time-frames, and eco-
nomic constraints play an obviously smaller role. 
The possibility of long-term programming is 
very far from established in the industrial and 
trade world, where the main theme is flexibility 
and the capacity for rapid adaptation to the 
changing trends of international trade. Further-
more, competition is less intense and time-
frames are longer in the military sphere. The 
replacement of successive generations of "pro-
ducts" and "differentiation" within each genera-
tion are not determined, unfortunately, by their 
actual performance in use. The military complex 
has the ability to attract the most outstanding 
scientific and technological talents, for it can 
provide them, in addition to high pay, with a 
secure and calm environment in which they are 
not under pressure to produce results in the 
short term. 
This is why the group of developed countries 
which has channeled significant resources to the 
military has low levels of industrial competitive-
ness with respect to conventional products; the 
highly industrialized group of countries which 
allocates hardly any resources to defence leads 
the way in international industrial competitive-
ness in these products. 
In the mid-1980s the manufacturing surplus 
of Japan, the Federal Republic and Italy, the 
three losers in the last world war, was close to 
US$220 000 million. On the other hand, the 
three victorious Powers had a deficit of around 
US$ 120 000 million, 75 % of which belonged to 
the United States. In general terms, the coun-
tries which suffered military defeat in that war 
are fuelling the deficit both of the victorious 
countries and of the rest of the world, and prim-
arily of the developing nations. 
There is an uneven inverse relationship 
between the volume of expenditure on defence 
as part of GDP and the degree of international 
competitiveness, measured in terms of the size 
of the manufacturing surplus or deficit in rela-
tion to the manufacturing product (figure 1). 
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The Soviet Union and the United States are at 
one extreme and the Federal Republic and Japan 
are at the other, leaving the United Kingdom, 
France, Sweden and Italy in the middle. The 
multiplier effect of defence expenditure on 
in t e rna t iona l industr ia l compet i t iveness 
appears to be negative, despite what conven-
tional wisdom says. 
A disarmament agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union would free a 
large part of the resources used for military pur-
poses. And if figure 1 describes the trend for 
each country correctly, these two countries will 
retrace the curve towards increased industrial 
competitiveness —a key factor in tackling their 
respective external deficits. Such an agreement, 
therefore, would not only have a beneficial 
impact on the gloomy collective perception of 
mankind's future, but would also encourage the 
restoration of balances in trade and financial 
flows. 
7. The sectoral structure 
and the incorporation of 
technological advances 
There is a surprising positive correlation 
between lack of natural resources and level of 
competitiveness in the industrial sector. Those 
countries which lack the "easy" source of foreign 
Figure 1 
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exchange offered by natural resources have no 
other alternative than to opt for the "building" 
of comparative advantages in the manufacturing 
sector. The experience of Japan, the Federal 
Republic and Italy is instructive in this respect. It 
contrasts with the experience of the United 
States, the Soviet Union and the United King-
dom, countries which are well endowed with 
natural resources or which ensured low-cost 
supplies from their colonies. 
The Nordic countries are a special case com-
bining a generous supply of natural resources 
and high competitiveness due to high levels of 
specialization in equipment and processes for 
the extraction, processing and finishing of such 
resources (agriculture, forestry, fisheries and 
energy, in the case of Norway). These are small 
countries for which specialization is a necessity 
and in which the "welfare State" coexists with an 
extremely open foreign-trade policy. Further-
more, they take the view that the quest for full 
employment does not necessarily undermine 
competitiveness, the maintenance of which is in 
turn a requirement for sustaining the levels of 
prosperity. The unemployment rate is main-
tained at around 3% in Sweden, Finland and 
Norway, whereas the average for Western 
Europe as a whole is about 10%. 
Italy offers a special example of industrial 
restructuring, for it does not follow the prevail-
ing model —based on the electronics and chemi-
cal axes— imposed by the United States, Japan, 
and the Federal Republic. In addition to making 
significant progress in these areas of intensive 
technology, Italy manages to maintain its inter-
national position by increasing its standards of 
excellence in sectors which, both from the "com-
mon sense" standpoint and from the academic 
standpoint —which rarely coincide— seemed 
condemned to be "losers" owing to the increas-
ing competition from the Asian NICs (Piore and 
Sabel, 1983 and 1984). Accordingly, the textiles, 
clothing and footwear branches, which have 
been practically dismantled in the other indus-
trialized countries, remain vigorous in Italy and 
achieve high productivity which enables them to 
consolidate their positions not only in the Euro-
pean Common Market but also in the United 
States (Piore and Sabel, 1983 and 1984; Ribeiro 
and others, 1987). 
Small and medium-scale industry plays a 
more important quantitative role in Italy than in 
the other European countries considered here, in 
particular the Federal Republic, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and France. Of greater signifi-
cance is the average increase in this sector's 
productivity from the 1970s, a variable which in 
a fairly broad range of industrial groupings 
seems to resemble that of big business. This 
contradicts the conventional view that there are 
structural differences between the two sectors, 
i.e., insuperable differences, with respect to pro-
ductivity, which are associated with economies 
of scale and technological rigidities. This pheno-
menon enabled Italy to achieve a very respecta-
ble position in areas such as textiles, clothing, 
footwear, wooden furniture and certain types of 
machinery —particularly for specific uses and 
notably for foodstuffs— in which economies of 
scale are not significant. 
The modernization of traditional sectors, 
whose disappearance was supposed to be inevit-
able, and the large increase in productivity in 
small and medium-sized businesses in a broad 
range of sectors are features which invest the 
Italian example with particular importance with 
respect to the options available to the Latin 
American countries; this of course does not 
mean setting them up as paradigms. 
Italy's dramatic restructuring in the past 
decade has been due only partially to the need to 
counteract the pressure from labour organiza-
tions, which take as their reference point the 
prevailing wage levels in the most capital-
intensive sectors (automobiles, chemicals and 
iron and steel). Accordingly, the increased pro-
ductivity is not only compatible with wage pres-
sures but also, up to a point, caused by them. This 
is a concrete example of the approach which 
combines increased competitiveness with higher 
productivity and technological progress (Anto-
nelli, 1987). 
France, whose industrial growth during the 
period has been only slightly lower than that of 
the Federal Republic and Italy, is undergoing 
changes in its industrial production profile 
which also differ from the classic cases of the 
three biggest countries. The electrical machinery 
and electronics sector leads the way. At the same 
time other groupings, some of them making 
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intensive use of manpower, others of natural 
resources or capital goods —non-metallic min-
erals, iron and steel, non-ferrous minerals, metal 
products, textiles, leather and wood— are under-
going what has become called deindustrealiza-
tion. The overall result is accelerated growth of 
manufacturing industries, intensive structural 
change, and specialization in electrical and elec-
tronic equipment —nuclear energy, aeronautics, 
railway equipment, telecommunications and 
armaments— a process which receives vigorous 
support from the use of the purchasing power of 
the public sector. (Boyer, 1983a and 1983b; 
Boyer and Mistral, 1983 ; Lodge and Vogel, 1987; 
Messine, 1984 and 1985; McCormick, 1987.) 
8. The use of policy tools 
and the institutional dimension 
In order to illustrate the importance of the dif-
ferent national approaches to the design and use 
of policy tools which affect the industrial sector, 
there now follows a brief comparative analysis of 
Japan and the United States. 
Like the rest of the world, Japan takes as its 
reference point the consumption pattern pre-
vailing in the United States. It does this for the 
fundamental purpose of producing the goods 
which that country demands, but on more favou-
rable terms with respect to cost and quality. The 
United States has thus become the main target of 
Japan's production and export strategy. How-
ever, the Japanese have adopted a number of 
domestic safeguards to ensure that the spread of 
this model (in any event gradual) does not 
impede the attainment of Japan's fundamental 
growth targets. "Modernity" is reproduced but 
its rate of absorption is restrained, in order to 
keep it in line with the strategic objective of 
domestic growth and therefore of improved 
competitiveness. 
Automobiles and housing play a crucial role, 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms, in the 
United States consumption pattern. It is no sur-
prise that the importance of these items of per-
sonal consumption has been steadily increasing 
over time, in step with rising incomes. The Japa-
nese authorities have been taking action to 
impede or delay the reproduction of this con-
sumption pattern in their domestic market. For 
this purpose they use a policy designed systemat-
ically to restrain consumption and stimulate sav-
ing, with respect both to housing and to the 
purchase of consumer goods, mainly durables. 
Whereas in the United States interest on savings 
accounts is taxed and interest on consumer loans 
is exempt from tax, exactly the opposite is the 
case in Japan. With respect specifically to hous-
ing, United States lending institutions are able to 
offer a lower interest rate than the banking sys-
tem, in addition to the fact that interest on home 
mortgages is exempt from tax, even in the case 
of the second or third family home. In Japan, 
housing loans are severely restricted, and people 
have to make a systematic and prolonged effort 
to save; until their savings reach the required 
amount, the funds are available for investment. 
The saving habit is also encouraged by the 
method by which businesses pay their 
employees, which includes sizeable quarterly 
bonuses which can represent up to a quarter or a 
third of actual earnings. Furthermore, the pen-
sions system is based on the contribution of a 
single large lump-sum, another factor which 
encourages the saving habit. The poor cover 
provided by the Japanese social-security system 
prompts families to set aside large sums for old 
age or health contingencies (McGraw, 1986). In 
addition, deposits to individual or family 
accounts can be made at all post offices. The 
willingness of the Japanese to save is not there-
fore due to cultural factors, at least not entirely. It 
is encouraged by mechanisms which guarantee 
that these savings are channeled into invest-
ment. The financial intermediation system, 
although privately owned, is regulated directly 
by the Bank of Japan and the Finance Ministry. 
They require specific percentages of available 
resources to be channeled to the sectors of high 
capital intensity, to which the country has 
decided to give priority. Until quite recently, the 
control system severely restricted the exit of 
capital from the country. In other words, the 
savings remained in Japan and were channeled, 
at least in specific proportions, to priority sec-
tors. This policy has been applied under succes-
sive sectoral programmes whose main goal is to 
consolidate the virtuous circle of growth with 
competitiveness. 
Factors which are completely absent from 
the experience of the United States play a signif-
icant role in the establishment of a highly com-
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petitive industrial system in Japan. These 
include all the measures designed to promote the 
acquisition of foreign technology by means of 
co-operation between different companies and 
co-ordination of their efforts in accordance with 
the sectoral priorities established by MITI. The 
keystone of this strategy is the so-called "reverse 
engineering", which means the purchase of tech-
nologically advanced goods with a view to dis-
mantling, reconstructing and improving them 
within the country. 
In addition, and unlike the other advanced 
countries and the countries of Latin America, the 
Japanese authorities adopted an extraordinarily 
restrictive policy with respect to foreign invest-
ment and manufacturing activities, for they con-
sidered that the domestic market was the 
principal learning base for the country's indus-
try. To hand it over to foreign companies would 
represent a serious threat to the capacity of 
domestic companies to acquire the necessary 
know-how and subsequently to invade external 
markets. Furthermore, the familiar Japanese 
policy of import controls encouraged domestic 
competition among Japanese companies, 
although within the framework of a captive 
market. 
Another relevant factor is the sectoral com-
ponent of fiscal policy, which dates from long 
ago in the case of Japan. Since the Meji era, the 
public sector has performed with great realism 
the function not only of ensuring macroeco-
nomic balances but also of allocating specific 
roles to specific areas —shipbuilding, railways, 
mining and silk textiles— to which priority had 
been assigned. This is fundamentally different 
from the concept of macroeconomic policy pre-
vailing in the other industrialized countries. 
They, and particularly the United States, adhere 
to the principle of intersectoral neutrality, argu-
ing that priorities must be determined by the 
market. 
The priority which the Japanese State 
accords to the industrial sector also emerges 
clearly in taxation policy. Within the industrial 
sector, moreover, priority is given to the areas 
which demonstrate the highest level of techno-
logical change or the potential to boost the 
domestic or international market. In 1981 the 
taxes-sales ratio for all economic activities in 
Japan stood slightly higher than in the United 
States (1.9% versus 1.1%). In the United States 
the taxes-sales coefficient in the chemical and 
heavy machinery industries was three times the 
overall ratio; in Japan, the respective coefficients 
were 1.5 and 1.8. In contrast, in the United States 
the financial sector bore a tax burden of 1.4%, 
while in Japan the figure was 2.3%. In other 
words, the overall tax rate was slightly higher in 
Japan, but significantly lower in areas of industry 
with a high technological content, and higher in 
the financial sector. 
As a result, and without disparaging the cul-
tural or religious factors, it can be asserted that 
everyday economic life is affected by factors 
which explain Japan's peculiar industrialization 
profile and much of its success in reconciling 
growth with equity. The frequent references to 
Confucius in explanation of the "success" of 
South-East Asia are hard to reconcile with the 
fact that until quite recently attempts were made 
to explain China's backwardness by alluding to 
that same personage. 
Where equity is concerned, it is worth noting 
that the greatest advances were achieved during 
the occupation of Japanese territory by United 
States troops. During that period the power of 
the big conglomerates weakened and the owner-
ship of agricultural land and big urban proper-
ties were redistributed (Mizoguchi, 1985). 
It is interesting to note that these crucial 
differences between specific tools of economic 
policy have come about despite the fact that the 
relative size of Japan's public sector is similar to 
that of the United States. In both economies the 
importance of public expenditure and the role of 
public enterprises in industrial production are 
more modest than in any of the European indus-
trialized countries, particularly the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This apparent institu-
tional similarity conceals fundamental differen-
ces of approach in the use of public sector 
instruments. Moreover, the Japanese industriali-
zation model has several elements in common 
with that of the Federal Republic. However, the 
relative weight of the public sector, both in the 
gross domestic product and in industrial sector 
companies, is considerably higher in the Federal 
Republic. 
Aggregate volumes are therefore a very 
inadequate datum for the purposes of acquiring a 
better understanding of the role of the State in a 
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country's industrialization. The almost symbio-
tic relationship between the State and the big 
business groups in Japan renders unnecessary 
any larger direct presence of the public sector in 
production activities. The low quantitative 
importance of the Japanese State has little to do 
with the phenomenon, at first sight a similar 
one, observed in the United States economy, 
where there is virtually no interaction between 
the public and private sectors (Lodge and Vogei, 
1987). In contrast, the relationship between the 
public sector, financial intermediation and the 
It is clear from the foregoing that it is not only 
companies which compete in the international 
market. It is also a field of confrontation between 
production systems, institutional structures and 
social organs, in which business is an important 
element but one integrated in a network of rela-
tions with the education system, the technologi-
cal infrastructure, management-labour relations, 
the public and private institutional apparatus, 
the financial system, etc. 
In the industrialized countries the debate 
about improved competitiveness takes place 
within a framework of institutions whose legiti-
macy no one questions. Moreover, the level of 
social cohesion is fairly high. The consumption 
pattern and the stock of technological knowl-
edge have been dispersed and homogenized. 
Their international engagement is based on the 
manufacturing sector. 
In order to increase their competitiveness, 
the governments of these countries promote 
programmes to support the advanced technol-
ogy sectors and adapt and invigorate the system 
of education, research and development, imple-
menting preferential programmes to support 
small and medium-scale industry, creating 
favourable conditions for co-operation between 
companies and between companies and the pub-
industrial sector in the Federal Republic is much 
more like the Japanese situation, although the 
impact of the State on the economy is substan-
tially smaller in the Asian giant (Zysman, 1984). 
The public deficit has represented about 5% 
of the product in recent years both in the United 
States and in Japan. But, while in the United 
States the deficit is equivalent to total net private 
savings, in Japan the ratio is barely 35%. The 
weight of the public sector and the relative size 
of its deficit are therefore similar, but their 
effects are very different (McGraw, 1986). 
lie sector, encouraging the reform of the system 
of industrial relations, and studying public 
investment programmes for improvement of 
the infrastructure, with emphasis on telecom-
munications. The business sector, in turn, 
explores new forms of organization and of asso-
ciation with the academic sector and with ven-
ture capital, and it tests various modalities of 
industrial relations, with a view to motivating 
the workers and encouraging their co-operation; 
businesses also develop the most varied forms of 
co-operation among themselves and with 
governments and regional groupings, especially 
in research and development. 
We are thus witnessing the creation of 
strategies which can be described as post-
Keynesian (Freeman, 1987). This phenomenon, 
which is far from exhaustion, coexists with a 
rhetoric and practice of an aggressive pre-
Keynesian type. The institutional structure of 
the advanced countries —which guarantees the 
various social and political actors the right to 
participate actively in the defence of their 
positions— ensures that pre-Keynesian policies 
do not impede the rise of post-Keynesian ones. 
In the light of our analysis, the most likely 
development is that the post-Keynesian strategy 
will shape the framework for economic develop-
ments in the coming decades. 
IV 
Competitiveness and post-Keynesian policies 
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